In Harrington v Purdue Pharma,1 the United States Supreme Court held that so-called “non-consensual third-party releases” were not permitted in restructuring plans proposed under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. A “third-party release” arises where creditors are asked to vote on a restructuring plan or scheme which not only proposes to release the debtor company (i.e. the company that has petitioned for bankruptcy or is proposing the scheme) from all liability but to also release other third parties from any associated liability.
Section 216 Insolvency Act 1986 provides that a person who has been a director of a company at any time in the 12 months before it goes into insolvent liquidation is prohibited for five years from being a director of, or directly or indirectly being concerned in or taking part in, the promotion, formation or management of a company with the same or similar name to the liquidated company (a “prohibited name”). Section 217 imposes personal liability on a director for debts incurred by a company which acts in breach of s 216.
Background
The defining feature of the restructuring plan, which was introduced by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, is the "cross class cram down" ("CCCD") mechanism it introduces as a means of imposing a settlement on recalcitrant creditors.
When a company is in financial distress, directors face difficult choices. Should they trade on to try to “trade out” of the company’s financial difficulties or should they file for insolvency? If they act too soon, will creditors complain that they should have done more to save the business? A recent English High Court case raises the prospect of directors potentially being held to account for decisions that “merely postpone the inevitable.”
Shareholder disputes can often be complex and emotionally charged, particularly in small or family-owned companies where personal relationships and business interests are deeply intertwined. When such disputes reach an impasse, the law provides several mechanisms for resolution. In particular, disgruntled shareholders have the ability to bring statutory based claims against the company.
The High Court in England recently issued a stark warning to directors who fail to consider their duties to the company and its creditors when entering financial difficulties.
Background
The High Court has ordered two former directors of British Home Stores ("BHS") to pay equitable compensation of £110 million in respect of misfeasance claims brought by the former retailer's joint liquidators: Wright v Chappell [2024] EWHC 2166 (Ch).
We examine the findings of the High Court’s decisions and discuss the lessons which directors of distressed businesses should take from them
The collapse of BHS in April 2016 remains one of the most extraordinary corporate failures in recent memory. Eight years on from the commencement of insolvency proceedings, and following a lengthy trial, the High Court has issued an expansive judgment on claims brought by the joint liquidators of four companies in the group against two former directors.
Factual background
Arising from the dramatic collapse of what was once one of Britain's most famous high street names, British Home Stores ("BHS"), the claims brought by the liquidators of the BHS group companies (the "BHS Group") against its former directors were already newsworthy.
In this article, James Hyne and Nicola Jackson, Partners in Charles Russell Speechlys’ Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency team, based in the